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PUBLIC LAW
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Henry G. McMahwn*
OFFICERS
Roughly half of the cases of general interest in this area de-
cided during the past term relate to the power to appoint of-
ficers and employees of local governmental bodies.
The legal issue presented in Funchess v. Lindsey1 was not
novel, even in Louisiana; but this decision serves admirably to
clarify the law on the subject and to implement its ready ap-
plication. There, the plaintiff, who was then serving as Super-
intendent of Schools of East Baton Rouge Parish, on January
5, 1961, was reappointed for another term of four years com-
mencing on July 1, 1961. At the time of this appointment, the
parish school board consisted of seven members, all of whom had
been elected by the qualified voters of their parish and districts.
Some few months later, four additional members of the parish
school board were appointed by the Governor.2 On June 8,
1961, a majority of the board, as thus enlarged, adopted a reso-
lution rescinding the prior appointment of plaintiff; and on
June 13, 1961, that same majority adopted a resolution appoint-
ing the named defendant as superintendent for the four year
term.
When the validity of these actions was questioned judicially,
the majority of the parish school board contended that the only
board which had authority to appoint the parish superintendent
to a new term of office was the board as constituted on the day
this new term began. This contention was rejected by the trial
court, which held plaintiff's appointment valid. On appeal, the
Court of Appeal for the First Circuit affirmed.
The right of a parish school board to appoint a superintend-
ent to a term of office a reasonable time in advance of the com-
mencement of this term had been recognized in Louisiana pre-
viously.3 So the issue actually presented was whether the East
Baton Rouge Board had acted unreasonably in making the ques-
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 133 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
2. Under La. Acts 1961 (2d Ex. Sess.), No. 7.
3. State ew rel. Russell v. Richardson, 178 La. 1029, 152 So. 749 (1934)
Wilson v. Hardin, 123 La. 736, 49 So. 490 (1909).
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tioned appointment. Both the trial and appellate courts resolved
this issue favorably to the plaintiff, and both relied upon two
admitted facts as controlling. First was the consistent practice,
followed by the East Baton Rouge Board since 1929, of making
these appointments five or six months in advance of the com-
mencement of the term. The second was the fact that none of
the members of the board on January 5, 1961, had any reason
to know that the composition of their board would be changed
prior to the commencement of the new term.
The time-honored remedy employed throughout the English-
speaking world to test the right to hold public office is the writ
of quo warranto. Its procedural functions have been broadened
in the great majority of American jurisdictions to include the
testing of the right to hold office in a private corporation, al-
though England and Massachusetts have never broadened its
functions similarly.4 This great common law remedy was
brought into the civil procedure of Louisiana by the Practice
Act of 1805. 5 It was retained in the Codes of Practice of 1825
and 1870. 6 That the primary function of quo warranto in Lou-
isiana was to test the right to hold public office is made evident
by the code provision to the effect that "this mandate is only
issued for the decision of disputes between parties in relation to
the offices in corporations, as when a person usurps the char-
acter of Mayor of a city, and such like.' '7
There have been two periods in our judicial history when the
precise functions of this remedy were in some doubt. The first
of these followed a holding by the Orleans Court of Appeal that
quo warranto did not lie to test the right to hold office in a pri-
vate corporation;8 but this holding was soon overturned.9 The
second followed the adoption of the Intrusion Into Office Act,10
which left some little doubt as to whether the new statutory
remedy had not completely superseded quo warranto, insofar as
its function to test the right to hold public office was concerned.
4. See the authorities cited in State ex rel. Palfrey v. Simms, 152 So. 395,
397 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
5. Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans of 1805, c.
XXVI.
6. Arts. 867-873.
7. La. Codes of Practice art. 868 (1825, 1870).
8. State ex rel. Jones v. Carradine, 147 So. 554 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
9. Leidenheimer v. Schutten, 194 La. 598, 194 So. 32 (1940) ; State e rel.
Palfrey v. Simms, 152 So. 395 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
10. La. Acts 1928, No. 102, the present LA. R.S. 42:76-87 (1950).
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This doubt, however, was resolved in Slater v. Blaize," in which
our Supreme Court held that, in a proper case, a plaintiff might
use either quo warranto or the new statutory remedy.
The functions of quo warranto were expanded, rather than
restricted, in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which de-
fined it as "a writ directing an individual to show by what
authority he claims or holds public office, or office in a cor-
poration, or directing a corporation to show by what authority
it exercises certain powers."' 2 The intention of the redactors to
retain its traditional function of testing the right to hold public
office is further evidenced by an official Comment under this
article, reading as follows:
"The provision referring to public office was incorpo-
rated on the theory that the Intrusion into Office Act, R.S.
42:76 et seq., does not give an individual the right to file
suit except when he is claiming the office."' 8
In the light of this legislative history of quo warranto in
Louisiana, it is interesting to learn from the "majority opinion"
in Lelong v. Sutherland14 that quo warranto does not lie to test
the right to hold public office. There, the plaintiff, as a citizen
and taxpayer, sought to enjoin the defendants, the elected mem-
bers of the Orleans Parish School Board, from continuing to
perform the duties of their office on the ground that the statute
under which the defendants had been elected had subsequently
been repealed, and a new board created, by legislative act.15 The
defense offered was that the recent legislation relied on by plain-
tiff had been held unconstitutional by the United States Su-
preme Court.' 6 After a trial on the merits, the trial court re-
fused to grant plaintiff the injunctive relief prayed for, holding
that since the new board created by the recent legislation had
been enjoined by the federal court from acting as such, an in-
junction preventing the defendants from acting would leave the
public school system of Orleans Parish without any governing
board whatsoever.
11. 204 La. 21, 14 So. 2d 872 (1943). See also Guilory v. Jones, 197 La.
165, 191, 1 So. 2d 65, 74 (1941).
12. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3901 (1960).
13. Comment (b) under art. 3901.
14. 134 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
15. La. Acts 1960 (3d Ex. Sess.), No. 4.
16. In memorandum decisions in Denny v. Bush, 367 U.S. 908 (1961) and
Legislature of Louisiana v. United States, 367 U.S. 908 (1961), affirming-Bush
v. Orleans Parish School Board,- 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La. 1961).
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The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, by a
divided court and on different grounds. The author of the "ma-
jority opinion" held that obviously no relief could be granted
the plaintiff under the Intrusion Into Office Act, as he was not
claiming any office, and further that relief could not be obtained
under quo warranto. The support offered for this latter holding
was that the Intrusion Into Office Act was special legislation
which conflicted with and prevailed over the general legislation
embodied in the code articles. Because of "some slight fear that
our new Code of Civil Procedure by Article 3901, in Chapter 4,
'Quo Warranto,' intended to give an individual the right to chal-
lenge the authority of someone purporting to hold public office,"
the concurring judge refused to subscribe to the "majority opin-
ion," but concurred in the result on the ground that since the
recent legislation had been held unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court, no effect could be given to it. The dis-
senting judge thought that quo warranto was the proper rem-
edy, and indicated his strong belief that the intermediate ap-
pellate court should render an independent decision with respect
to the constitutionality of the recent legislation.
The first impression which the reader obtains from this case
is that it may cause appreciable damage to the pertinent pro-
visions of the new procedural Code. This reaction, however, dis-
sipates under a careful evaluation of the case. In the first place,
this fragmented decision will have no value as a precedent. Sec-
ond, neither Slater v. Blaize nor the legislative history of the quo
warranto provisions in the new procedural Code appear to have
been brought to the attention of the court. Third, quo warranto
was recognized as a proper remedy to test the right to hold pub-
lic office by two other decisions of the appellate courts during
the past term.17
In both of the cases where quo warranto was so employed,
the office in question was membership on the Board of Commis-
sioners of Waterworks District No. 3 of St. Mary Parish. In
Aucoin v. Spencer,'8 the defendant was held to have vacated her
office by missing four consecutive monthly meetings of the
board.' 9 In Tabor v. Siracusa,20 the defendant was held to have
17. In Aucoin v. Spencer, 135 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) and Tabor
v. Siracusa, 135 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
18. 135 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
19. Under the express language of LA. R.S. 33:3819 (1950).
20. 135 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
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been removed from office by the Governor. The court applied
the rule that all gubernatorial appointees not requiring Senate
confirmation, and not required to be appointed from a list of
persons submitted by others, serve at the pleasure of the Govern-
or and can be removed by him at any time. The statute creating
the board required gubernatorial appointment from a list sub-
mitted by the police jury of the parish ;21 but this provision was
held to apply only to original appointments, and not those made
to fill subsequent vacancies.
Chapman v. Bordelon22 resolved an open question raised by a
hiatus in the Lawrason Act, regulating the government of
municipalities using the mayor-board of aldermen form of gov-
ernment. Specifically, the question presented was whether the
mayor of Ville Platte had the right to veto the appointment of
municipal employees by the board of aldermen. Under the stat-
ute, the right to appoint municipal employees was not granted
expressly to either the mayor or the board of aldermen, but cer-
tain general language therein could be interpreted as granting
the power to both.2 The board of aldermen contended that it
held the appointive power, since appointment constituted an ad-
ministrative act. The mayor insisted that he had the right to
veto the board's appointment of employees, under his statutory
power to veto "any law, by-law, or ordinance adopted" by the
board.2 4 The case, therefore, turned on the meaning to be given
to the word "ordinance." The trial court held that the mayor
had no right to veto any appointments except to the offices of
city attorney, street commissioner, and city treasurer. The
Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, by a divided court, held
that the mayor had no power to veto any appointments of mu-
nicipal officers and employees made by the board of aldermen.25
The majority of this court held that the mayor's power to veto
ordinances was restricted to the vetoing of legislation, and did
not extend to the board's appointment of employees on simple
motion. This majority further held that under the clear statu-
tory language the board of aldermen had the exclusive power to
elect the city attorney, street commissioner, and city treasurer.
The dissenting judge agreed with this latter position, but he
expressed the view that the majority of the court had construed
21. LA. R.S. 33:3813 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 229.
22. 242 La. 637, 138 So. 2d 1 (1962).
23. LA. R.S. 33:362, 33:401(A) (1950).
24. Id. 33:404.
25. Chapman v. Bordelon, 132 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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the word "ordinance" too strictly and that the mayor had the
power to veto the board's appointments of municipal employees.
Under certiorari, the majority of the Supreme Court ap-
proved the views of the dissenting judge of the intermediate
appellate court. One of the Supreme Court Justices, however,
dissented, and accepted the reasoning of the majority of the
court of appeal. This dissenting Justice further pointed out that,
as a result of the holding of the majority of Justices of the Su-
preme Court, the failure of a mayor and a board of aldermen to
agree with respect to the appointment of municipal employees
might easily lead to an impasse depriving the people of the com-
munity of necessary municipal services. If the opinion of the
dissenting Justice does nothing more, it definitely indicates a
pressing need for clarification in the Lawrason Act.
A somewhat similar struggle over the power of appointing
municipal employees was presented in Foti v. Montero,26 where
the municipality was operating under the mayor-commission
council form of government. There, the intermediate appellate
court held that, under the applicable statute, the commission
council as a whole, and not the mayor, had the exclusive power,
duty, and function of appointing all municipal employees.
ORDINANCES
The subject of the redistricting of political districts has been
an extremely popular one during the past few years. It is not
surprising, therefore, to find the subject judicially presented
with respect to municipal election districts. The Home Rule
Charter of the City of New Orleans requires the municipal coun-
cil to redistrict the five councilmanic districts of the city after
each federal census; and in compliance with this mandate, the
city council adopted a redistricting ordinance after the 1960
census. This ordinance was held invalid by the Supreme Court
in Schlekau v. New Orleans,27 on the ground that it did not com-
ply with the Home Rule Charter mandate, requiring equal di-
vision, as nearly as possible, of the city's population among its
five councilmanic districts. A population disparity of 28,086 be-
tween two of these districts was held to be arbitrary, unreason-
able, and capricious.
26. 136 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
27. 241 La. 1079, 133 So. 2d 603 (1961).
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REGULATION OF UTILITIES.
The defendant in Town of Coushatta v. Valley Electric Mem-
bership Corp.28 was an electric cooperative which had obtained
a franchise from Red River Parish to distribute electricity
throughout the parish, but outside of its incorporated municipali-
ties. Certain of its transmission lines were constructed in areas
near, but outside of, the Town of Coushatta. In 1956, the latter
extended its municipal limits to include additional areas. In
1960, without the permission or consent of the municipality, the
defendant extended its transmission lines to serve a single cus-
tomer whose property lay completely within one of these an-
nexed areas. The Town of Coushatta and Central Louisiana
Electric Company, which held the municipal franchise to dis-
tribute electricity within the municipality, sought to enjoin the
defendant from distributing electricity to any customer within
the municipal limits, as extended.
On the original hearing, the Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit held that the defendant had acted at its peril in con-
structing its lines adjacent to a growing municipality; and that
when the latter extended its territorial limits, only the holder of
a municipal franchise could supply customers within any an-
nexed areas.
In the wake of this sweeping decision, the intermediate ap-
pellate court was "besieged with requests by amici curiae for
permission to file briefs on behalf of numerous interested util-
ity cooperatives," and a rehearing was granted to reconsider all
phases of the controversy. On rehearing, the majority of the
.court restricted its original holding appreciably. The majority
opinion on rehearing, recognizing the fact that the defendant
had obtained a franchise from the parish some years before,
held that any lines which the defendant might have constructed
in areas subsequently annexed could be controlled by the munic-
ipality only after expropriation.2 9 However, since the single
transmission line involved had been constructed by the defend-
ant after the municipality's annexation of the property of the
single customer served by this line, and without the permission
or consent of the municipality, the court granted injunctive re-
lief to the plaintiffs to restrain any continuance of that service.
... 28. 19 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), rehearing 1962.
29. On this point, see City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Light & Power Co., 126
So. 2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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